) defined values for games in which the players are organized into a priori coalition configurations. As a difference of coalition structures, introduced by Owen (1977) in games with coalition configuration, it is supposed that players organize themselves into coalitions not necessarily disjoint. In this paper, we redefine coalition configuration values by using the concept of share function. A share function assigns to every player in a game his share in the worth to be distributed. Using this concept, van der Laan and van den Brink (2002 Brink ( , 2005 obtained a general share function for games with coalition structure. As they did it for coalition structures, we define and characterize a general share function for games with coalition configuration.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) describes a situation in which players can obtain payoffs by cooperation. To illustrate some notions of this paper, let us first present two examples of TU-games. Example 1. Imagine a national parliament with representatives belonging to different political parties. The players of this game are the following three parties:
• Left party;
• Right party;
• Center party.
The second example comes from Aumann and Myerson (1988) .
Example 2. Consider the diplomatic relations between three countries:
• United States;
• Israel;
• Syria. * A value function for such a game is a function, which assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. One of the main solution concepts for TU-games is the Shapley value (1953). One another well-known solution is the Banzhaf value, which was originally introduced by Banzhaf (1965) for simple games 1 , essentially equivalent to those proposed by Penrose (1946) and Coleman (1971) , and extended by Owen (1975) to all TU-games. The main idea of these values is to compute the probability for a player to be pivotal in a coalition. 2 The problem of these values is that they don't take into consideration a priori relation between the different players. Indeed, in many negotiations, due to some common interests, some agents prefer to cooperate together instead of cooperating with other players. These situations often arise, like in the first example, where we can suppose that due to ideological reasons, some parties are closer to one another. For instance, a center party can form a coalition with a left wing party in order to obtain a Center-Left coalition.
In order to represent these cooperation situations in a realistic way, some authors introduced games with a priori coalition structure, that is a finite partition of the player set into disjoint coalitions 3 . The reason why we consider coalition structure and not only coalition, is that in general the players can benefit by joining forces in some situations, and act separately in other ones. It depends on the existing relationship between these players and this for personal or political reasons. Note that, contrary to the majority of existing literature, we think that coalition structures is more a summary of the relationship between the players, than a summary of a priori existing coalitions. However, in the sequel, we discuss either relationship or coalition.
For games in a priori given coalition structure, several value functions have been proposed in the literature. An important reference is Aumann and Drèze (1974) . They extended the Shapley value to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits into sub games played by the coalitions separately. Every player receives the payoff allocated to him by the Shapley value in the sub game he is playing within his coalition. Later on, Owen (1977 Owen ( , 1981 proposed and characterized a modification of the Shapley and Banzhaf values with respect to a coalition structure. In this case, there is a two-level interaction between the players. Firstly, coalitions play an external game among them, and each one receives a payoff; secondly in internal games the payoffs of each coalition are distributed amongst their members. Both payoffs, in the external game and in the internal game, are given by the Shapley value or the Banzhaf value. In the first example, this two-level interaction implies for the different parties, that their payoffs depends on their payoffs in the political group they belongs to (internal game), but also on the group payoffs in the parliament (external game).
Unfortunately there is also a problem with these values, since there is no reason to assume that individuals will organize themselves to defend their interests into coalitions that are necessarily disjoint. Look at the second example. It is well known that the United States have closer diplomatic relations with Israel, but also with Syria, which is one of their partner in the Middle East. If we consider only coalition structures, since the USA are in relation with Israel and with Syria, according to the definition of a coalition structure, the three countries belong to the same a priori coalition. In reality this is not the case, since Syria and Israel having diplomatic relations with the United States but not with each other.
Consequently coalition structures do not adequately represent some bargaining situations. One solution to model these more complex relationships between different players is to consider the more general concept of coalition configuration, as introduced by Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ). Rather than considering disjoint coalitions, in a game with coalition configuration, we consider the partition of the individual set into coalitions not necessarily disjoint; whose union is the grand coalition. It is assumed that player can be- 1 In a simple game, the possible payoffs is assumed to be either "0" or "1". 2 A player whose desertion from a winning coalition turns it into a losing one is called a pivotal player. 3 A coalition structure is assumed to be given exogenously.
long to more than one coalition in order to attain a better position to face the bargaining process. If we look at a national parliament as described in the first example, this means that the central party can form a coalition (can be in relation) with the left party and another coalition (be in relation) with the right party, without these two parties being connected. In their works, Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) generalized the Shapley and Banzhaf values with reference to coalition configurations, and simultaneously the values proposed by Owen (1977 Owen ( , 1981 4 . Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) provided interesting axiomatic characterizations of their values. However, as Banzhaf value, their generalization of Banzhaf to games with coalition configuration, fails to satisfy the efficiency axiom 5 . A way to solve this problem is to normalize this value as we can normalize Banzhaf. However, as point out by Dubey and Shapley (1979) , such normalization is not as innocent as it seems. Indeed the normalized Banzhaf value violates two important axioms, namely the dummy player property and the additivity axiom 6 .
The concept of share function introduced by van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) is an alternative approach to efficiently allocate the worth of the grand coalition. A share function assigns to every player in a TU-game his share in the worth to be distributed. In other words, the payoff of the grand coalition is completely redistributed to all players. They first applied in 1998 the concept of share function to Shapley and Banzhaf values. The Shapley (respectively Banzhaf) share function assigns to every player his Shapley (Banzhaf) value divided by the sum of the Shapley (Banzhaf) values of all players in the game. Moreover they provided an axiomatic characterization of a class of share functions containing among others the Shapley share function and the Banzhaf share function.
In the same way, in 2002 and 2005, they introduced share functionx for games with coalition structure. They obtained again an axiomatic characterization of a class of share functions for games with coalition structure containing the share functions corresponding to the values introduced by Owen as special case. They redefined Owen values in the same ways they redefined Shapley and Banzhaf value.
We find two advantages of share functions. Firstly, beside the fact that a share function respects efficiency, the use of share functions has no impact under the other properties verified by the original values. And secondly it is a natural and simple method to define a general class of share functions.
In this paper, we apply the idea of share functions, as introduced by van der Laan and van den Brink (1998, 2002 and 2005) , to define solutions for games with coalition configuration. We first redefine the coalition configuration values corresponding to Shapley given by Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) as a coalition configuration share function. This share function satisfies a variant of the multiplication property introduced by van der Laan and van den Brink (2002 Brink ( , 2005 . According to this property, the share of a player in the worth of the grand coalition is equal for each coalition he belongs to, to the product of two shares: a share in the internal game and a share in the external game. Using this multiplication property, analogously we generalize the Banzhaf share function to games with coalition configuration.
And as the concept of share function provides also a natural method to define solutions for games with coalition configuration, we define a general class of share functions for coalition configuration. We characterize the new value by adapting van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) axioms and adding a specific axiom called "merger". This axiom refers to a special sort of symmetric players, named doubles. Merger axiom requires that these doubles can be amalgamated into a single player, without affecting the payoffs of the rest of players. This axiom also characterizes coalition configuration values.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some preliminaries on games and values, both for caolition structures and for coalition configurations. In Section 3 we recall the concept of share functions and present some results about games with coalition structure. In Section 4, we redefine the values for games with coalition configuration as share functions and we introduce a general share function for such games. Finally in section 5, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this general share, using the "merger axiom".
Preliminaries
First recall some basic notions about games and values.
Games and values
A TU-game is a pair (N, v) defined by a finite set of players N , usually N = {1, 2, ..., |N |}, and a function v : 2 N → R, that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S) and satisfies v(∅) = 0. In this paper we consider monotone TU-games, i.e. games (N, v)
By G we denote the set of all monotone game. A monotone game is a null game if v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . Such a game on player set N is denoted (N, v 0 ), and G + is the set of all monotone games that are not null. Thereafter, when we talk about game, it will be a monotone game.
A value function on G is a function denoted ϕ which assigns to every
7 . Then the two main solution concepts on the class G of monotone games, Shapley value (ϕ Sh ) and Banzhaf value (φ B ), are the functions defined for all i ∈ N by
The Shapley value is characterized by the well-known axioms of efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity 8 . The Banzhaf value satisfies also the last three axioms, but as already known, not efficiency. Indeed taking the sum of the Banzhaf values over all players, we obtain that
which is generically not equal to v(N ). In order to efficiently allocate the worth of the grand coalition according to the Banzhaf value, we can replace the Banzhaf value by the normalized Banzhaf value (ϕ B ) which is an efficient value, given by
and ϕ B i (N, v 0 ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . 7 We denote by |S| the number of player in the coalition S ⊆ N . 8 This four axiom will be presented in Section 5.
Coalition structure
Let us now consider situations in which the player are organized in a priori given coalition structure.
A coalition structure on a player set N is a finite partition P 0 = {P 1 , ..., P m } of m nonempty, disjoint subsets of N , i.e. ∪ m k=1 P k = N , and P k ∩ P l = ∅ for all k, l ∈ {1, ..., m}, k = l. In the following the set of coalitions in the coalition structure is denoted by M = {1, ..., k, ..., m}, with k ∈ M representing coalition P k ∈ P . The set of all coalition structures of N is denoted P N 0 ; a game with coalition structure (N, v, P 0 ); and the set of all games with coalition structure GP
To illustrate a partition, consider like in the first example that N is the set of political parties in a country. Then P 0 can be viewed as the repartition of these political parties into groups based on ideological ideas, each party being in one and only one group.
A coalition structure value (CS-value) θ on the set GP N 0 assigns a payoff to every player for any game with coalition structure (N, v, P 0 ). As said before the arrangement of the players into a coalition structure implies two kinds of negotiation, among the coalitions of the coalition structure, and inside each of these coalitions. Therefore, in order to generalize Shapley value to games with coalition structure, Owen (1977) proposed two games which reflect this two-level interaction structure.
For given game (N, v, P 0 ) ∈ GP N 0 , with P 0 = {P 1 , ..., P m } and M = {1, ..., m}, the external game 9 between coalitions denoted (M, v P ) ∈ G, is a m-player game defined by
In this game induced by (N, v, P 0 ), when coalition of P 0 are considered as players, the worth of the grand coalition is distributed amongst the coalitions. Observe that
In the second game, the internal game, which takes place inside each coalition, the payoff of each coalition is distributed amongst the players within this coalition. The following definition of this game (equivalent to those of Owen (1977) ) is due to van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 . The internal game between the player in a coalition P k , denoted (P k , v P k ), is defined as a |P k |-player game given by
is the marginal contribution of S ⊆ P k to the union P (L) of the coalition P j , j ∈ L. So, the internal game (P k , v P k ) is a weighted sum of the games (
, where the weight of the game (P k , v P k ,L ) is equal to the Shapley weightw
The outcome of such a two-level interaction is reflected by the Owen-Shapley-CS value, θ OS , which is for a player i belonging to a coalition P k , the Shapley value of this player in the internal game corresponding to P k , that is
10
Analogously Owen (1981) generalized Banzhaf value to games with coalition structure. In this case the outcome of the two-level interaction is reflected by the Owen-Banzhaf-CS value, θ OB , which is for a player i belonging to a coalition P k , the Banzhaf (non normalized) value of this player in the internal game (P k ,v P k ) ∈ G, corresponding to P k . That is 9 Owen (1977) introduced this game under the name of "quotient game". 10 In this formulation, the external game does not appear clearly, but is useful to determine the payoff in the internal game. 
Coalition configuration
As point out in the introduction, games with coalition structure do not always reflect the complex relationships that may exist in a bargaining game. To solve this problem Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) extended the approach of Owen (1977 Owen ( , 1981 in games where players are grouped in coalitions not necessarily disjoint.
A coalition configuration of N is a finite collection P = {P 1 , ..., P m }, of m non-empty subset of N , such that ∪ m k=1 P k = N . The only assumption is that a player belongs to at least one coalition. The set of coalitions in the coalition configuration is also denoted M = {1, ..., m}. For every i ∈ N , we will write P i : {P r ∈ P : i ∈ P r } as the members of P , containing i.
We denote by P N and GP N = P N * G the set of all coalition configurations and all games with coalition configuration, respectively. And (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N is a game with coalition configuration. Note that coalition structures are special cases of coalition configurations, when there is no possible union between two coalitions. This means that GP N 0 ⊆ GP N . Consider the simple example of the relations between the countries within the European Union to illustrate the idea underlying coalition configuration. If N is the set of European countries, P may be seen as a repartition of countries in various coalitions, coalitions that are formed for economic or geopolitical reasons. Nothing prevents a country to belong to several coalitions, not including the same members.
A coalition configuration η (CCF-value) on the set GP N assigns a payoff to every player for any game with coalition configuration (N, v, P ). Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) generalized Shapley and Banzhaf to games with coalition configuration, as Owen (1977 Owen ( , 1981 generalized them to games with coalition structure. In order to do that, they also decomposed the bargaining process in two games, namely the internal and the external game. Notice that the internal games (P r , v Pr ) and (P r ,v Pr ) and the external game (M, v P ) are similar to those introduced to define values for games with coalition structure. Then they provided the two following values, corresponding to the generalization of Shapley and Banzhaf respectively.
Owen-Shapley-CCF value, denoted η OS is defined by
and Owen-Shapley-CCF value, denoted η OB is defined by
In a game with coalition configuration, the value received by a player must be equal to the sum for each coalition a player i belongs to, of the Shapley value (Banzhaf value) of this player in the corresponding internal games. The main difference with CS-values, is that a player can belong to more than one coalition, then we must sum up all the payoffs he receives in each coalition he belongs to. Note that, if P is a partition (there is no intersection between two coalition), then η
Obviously, Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b ) characterized these two values. We don't insist on their characterization, since only one of their axioms will be useful for our characterization, namely the "merger axiom" (see Section 5) . However, as Banzhaf, and also Owen-Banzhaf-CS, Owen-Banzhaf-CCF value is not efficient. Then as suggested by van den Brink and van der Laan (1998), we will introduce share functions in order to solve this problem. Before to present share functions for games with coalition configuration, let us remind in the following section, the main results of van den Brink and van der Laan (1998, 2002, 2005 ).
Share function
Let us first present share functiosn in the case of TU-games.
Share functions for TU-games
A share function assigns to each player in a game (N, v) his share in the worth of the grand coalition. More formally a share function on G is a function ρ which assigns to 
and ρ
The Banzhaf share function ρ B on G is defined by
In order to obtain Shapley share or Banzhaf share, we need just to divide Shapley value (Banzhaf value) by the corresponding sum of payoffs of all the players. As Shapley is efficient, this sum for Shapley is equal to v(N ), which is not generally the case for Banzhaf, which is not efficient. However normalized Banzhaf is efficient, then we can obtain Banzhaf share by dividing normalized Banzhaf by v(N ).
Notice that for null games the concept of share function is itself not very interesting. However we still define it for null games since it will be useful for games with coalition structure and coalition configuration, where null games can appear in the internal game, even if the global game is not a null game. For null games, share function give to all players an equal share.
Van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) defined a general share function for TU-games which contains among others Shapley share and Banzhaf share functions.
Before presenting their result, let us first gives some properties for a real valued functions µ :
And finally, this function is µ−symmetric on C if for every pair (N, v) ∈ C, every pair of symmetric player 11 i and j in (N, v), and every S ⊂ N such that {i, j} ⊂ S , and both restricted games (S\ {i} , v S\{i} ) and > 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., |N |}, and a function µ w :
We then have a general formula for share functions where the two variables µ w (N, v) and w |N | |S| can be interpreted like the sum of payoffs of all the player in the game (N, v), and a weighted system. From this formula, we can state that:
, then we have Shapley share ρ Sh ;
• and if w
We can also obtain another share function from ρ
, such as Deegan-Packel share as introduced by van den Brink and van der Laan (1998). They proposed a share inspired by the value of Deegan-Packel (1979) and given by
Example 3. Consider the monotonic game (N, v) with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} given by
The Shapley, Banzahf and Deegan-Packel shares of the players in this game are given by
. They are obtained from 
Share functions for games with coalition structure
As they did it for TU-games, van den Brink and van der Laan (2002, 2005) introduced share functions for games with coalition structure based on a property stated by Owen (1977) . Indeed, when he introduced Owen-Shapley-CS for the first time, he asserted that all values defined for games with coalition structure should satisfy the property of "multiplication". According to this property, the fraction in the total payment v(N ), received by a player i belonging to a coalition P k , should be equal to the product of the fraction that the coalition P k receives in the external game between coalitions (coalitions split v(M )), and the fraction that this player i receives in the internal game, when the same value function is applied to these two games. Implicitly Owen (1977) A share function for game with coalition structure (CS-share) is a function ψ(N, v, P 0 ) on GP N 0 satisfying i∈N ψ i = 1 for all (N, v, P 0 ) ∈ GP N 0 and which assigns to every player in a game with coalition structure a share in the worth to be distributed.
From this definition we can define Owen-Shapley-CS share for games with coalition structure, ψ OS , which assigns to every player in a game with coalition structure his share according to the Owen-Shapley-CS value. This function ψ OS i (N, v, P 0 ) is obtained by dividing Owen-Shapley-CS value by v(N ):
Moreover to take into account the multiplication property, we can reformulate the Owen-Shapley-CCF share of player i, as the product of two Shapley shares:
• the first share is the share ρ
• the second share is the share ρ
Then in a game (N, v, P 0 ) ∈ GP 
Analogously, they presented the Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function which assigns to every player i, belonging to a coalition P k , the product of the Banzhaf share of coalition P k in the external game between coalitions and the Banzhaf share of player i in the internal game corresponding to P k . For all i ∈ P k ∈ P 0 , ψ B i is given by
Notice that, in general, the share of a player i according to this Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function is different from the function that is obtained from Owen-Banzhaf-CS value. This function, which is for every i ∈ N and every (N, v) ∈ G, given by ψ
(N, v, P 0 ) is obtained by normalizing the sum of the components of the Owen-Banzhaf-CS value to one, whereas in the Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function normalization takes place on twolevels, namely in the external game (M, v P ) the sum of the Banzhaf shares of the coalitions are normalized to one and in each internal game (P k ,v P k ) the sum of the Banzhaf shares of the players in P k are normalized to one. Obviously, by definition the Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function satisfies the multiplication property, which is not the case for ψ OB i (N, v, P 0 ) as already proved by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 . That is why they obtained this alternative generalization of the Banzhaf share function for games with coalition structure.
Consequently, if there are two ways to get ψ OS , either by the multiplication property, or by dividing Owen-Shapley-CS by v(N ), this is not the case for ψ B . Thus, motivated us to define Owen-Banzhaf-CS share from a CS-function as we get Owen-Shapley-CS. We obtain then the following proposition.
. We can deduce that ϕ
. We have also ρ
.
We have then expressed Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function from a CS-value, which can be seen as the Owen-Banzhaf-CS normalized value. This value θ B i (N, v, P 0 ), is for a player i belonging to a coalition P k , the normalized Banzhaf value of this player in the internal game (P k ,v P k ) ∈ G, corresponding to P k . It may be noted, that thinking in terms of value or CS-value has several problems, especially for Banzhaf and Owen-Banzhaf-CS, where one must distinguish between the normalized and non-normalized value. The share functions have the advantage of removing all these drawbacks.
A general share function for games with coalition structure
We present now the general share function for games with coalition structure . The only difference with the general share function as introduced by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 , concerns the definition of the internal game.
As argued before, for such a game the payoff of a player can be seen as the result of a first level game between coalitions and a second level game between the players within a coalition. Let µ : G → R be an additive, positive and symmetric function on G, game (N, v) ∈ G and a coalition structure P 0 ∈ P N 0 , then we have the two following games. The first one is the external game (M, v P ) ∈ G introduced previously to define OwenShapley-CS et Owen-Banzhaf-CS. The second one is the µ-internal game which is a generalization of the internal games v P k (S) andv P k (S) introduced also to define OwenShapley-CS and Owen Banzhaf-CS. This game is denoted (P k , v
where M = {1, ..., m}, µ(M, v P P k |S ) positive and the game M, v P P k |S on the player set M of coalitions is given by the characteristic function v
So v P P k |S assigns to every coalition L (of coalitions in the coalition structure) the worth of the union of these coalitions where coalition P k is replaced by S ⊆ P k . That is, player l ∈ M/ {k} represents a priori coalition P l = P k in the coalition structure P 0 , whereas player k represents the sub coalition S ⊆ P k instead of the whole P k . Notice that this game also appears in Owen (1977) , as the "almost quotient game".
We will now present a general share function for games with coalition structure, which is obtained from the multiplication property. Proposition 2. Let µ : G → R be an additive, positive and symmetric function on G and let ρ µ be the general share function. Then the function ψ µ on GP N 0 defined by
is a share function and satisfies for all (N, v, P 0 )∈ GP N 0 the following properties: i)
is also a share function for games with coalition structure. Moreover we have:
, from the definition of a general share function. Since
According to the first property, this function is consistent, in the sense that the sum of the payoffs of all the players in a coalition P k is equal to the payoffs receive by these coalitions in the external game. The second and third properties show that ψ µ generalizes ρ µ , because when there is only one coalition in the coalition structure or when there is n singleton coalitions in the coalition structure, the general share for games with coalition structure coincides with the general share for TU-games.
In the next proposition, we show how we can obtain Owen-Shapley-CS share and Owen-Banzhaf-CS share from ψ µ .
Proposition 3. The CS-share function for games with coalition structure ψ µ is i) Owen-Shapley-CS share
Van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) show that if
ii) Van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) proved that if
, and we just need to provide that (P k ,v
. From this formula, we can also obtain other share functions for games with coalition structure. Especially, like ρ DP is obtained from ρ µ , we can obtain a CS-share for DeeganPackel from ψ µ . This function denoted ψ
As mentioned above, all these results have already been obtained by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 . Indeed they also provided a class of share functions for games with coalition structure which is closed to ours. The only difference is they do not defined the µ-internal game in the same way. Our results are not fundamentally different from theirs. Howewer we choose to define our game in such a manner, since we think it was more adapted to the problem of coalition structure, but also and more importantly to the problem of coalition configuration. A discussion about the difference between our games is given in Appendix.
Example 4. Consider again the game (N, v) as introduced in Example 3, but now suppose that the coalition structure P 0 = {P 1 , P 2 } is formed, with P 1 = {1, 2, 3} and P 2 = {4, 5}. We have then the external game M, v
Let the values of µ w (M, v P ) and w |M | |L| , the two variables associate to this external game given in Table 1 . Then we obtain ρ
and ρ µ DP (M, v P ) = 11 14 , 3 
14
. So we now determine the shares of each players in each internal games. Let us begin with the internal game corresponding to P 1 . Using for L ⊆ {P 2 } ⊆ M , the marginal contribution v P1,L (S), S ⊆ P 1 , as given in Table 3 and the weight vectorsw
, we obtain the internal game v P1 µ (S), given in Table 4 . And with w |P1| |S| and µ w (P 1 , v P1 µ ) as given in Table 2 , we obtain ρ
. In the same way, for (P 2 , v P2 µ ) the internal game corresponding to P 2 we obtain ρ , we see that the shares of players 1, 2 and 3 increase, and the shares of players 4 and 5 decrease in ψ OS . Indeed, the first three players take advantage of their union, which is not the case for players 4 and 5. To conclude this section, note that van den Brink and van der Laan (2002, 2005) proposed different characterizations of this general share function for games with coalition structure. We don't present them here, but most of their axioms will be useful to characterize the general share function for games with coalition configuration, that we will present now.
Share functions for games with coalition configuration
In this part, we apply the methods used by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 and 2005) in order to transform into share functions, Owen-Shapley-CCF value and OwenBanzhaf-CCF value. And then, we will generalize our results to a large class of share functions.
Owen-Shapley-CCF share and Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share
Let us begin with the definition of a share function for games with coalition configuration (CCF-share). This function denoted Π(N, v, P ) and define on GP N , assigns to every player in a game with coalition configuration a share in the worth to be distributed such that
We can therefore define Owen-Shapley-CCF share, which assigns to every player in a game with coalition configuration his share according to the Owen-Shapley-CCF value, as the function Π OS i (N, v, P ) given by
And like above, from the multiplication property, we can reformulate Owen-Shapley-CCF share of a player i, as the sum for each coalition this player i belongs to, of the product of two Shapley shares:
• the first share is the share ρ Sh r (M, v P ) of coalition r in the external game (M, v P ) between coalitions;
• and the second share is the share ρ Sh i (P r , v Pr ) of player i in the internal game (P r , v Pr ).
The external game and internal game are the same as those introduced to characterize Owen-Shapley-CS share function.
We then obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let a game (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N with P = {P 1 , ..., P m } and M = {1, ..., m}, then the Owen-Shapley-CCF share function is given for a player i by
. Since v(N ) is given, then
. And we know that v Pr (P r ) = ϕ 
And since by definition ρ
The main difference with Owen-Shapley-CS share is that a player can belong to more than one coalition, then we must sum up all the power he receives in each coalition he belongs to. Note also that this function is efficient, since Albizuri and al. (2006a, 2006b) showed that i∈N η
We will now present Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share function. As Owen-Banzhaf-CS function, Owen-Banzhaf-CCF function does not satisfy the multiplication property. Consequently, in order to obtain Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share, we must first define a CCF-value, different from η This value is for a player i, the sum, for all coalition he belongs to, of the normalized Banzhaf value of this player in the corresponding internal games (P r ,v Pr ) ∈ G. As we obtained a normalization of Owen-Banzhaf-CS value and Banzhaf value, we obtain a normalization of Owen-Banzhaf-CCF value.
Then the Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share which assigns to every player in a game with coalition configuration his share according to the Owen-Banzhaf-CCF normalized value, is the function denoted Π B i (N, v, P ) and given by
Pr ). Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share of player i is also for each coalition i belongs to, the result to the product of two Banzhaf shares: Banzhaf share of i in the corresponding internal games (P r ,v Pr ) and Banzhaf share of coalitions r in the external game (M, v P ).
Proposition 5. Let a game (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N with P = {P 1 , ..., P m } and M = {1, ..., m}, then Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share for a player i is equal to
Proof. We proceed in three steps: 1) To begin, we prove that i∈N η
, and from (a) and (b),
For the same reason that Owen-Banzhaf-CS share function is different from the Banzhaf type CS-share function, Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share function
We can state also, that this function is efficient. Indeed as we proved in the previous proof that i∈N η
A general share function for games with coalition configuration
We can now generalize the share function ρ µ to games with coalition configuration. As already noticed for Owen-Shapley CCF and Owen-Banzhaf-CCF, for such a game the payoff of a player can be seen as the sum for each coalition he belongs to, as the result of a first level game between coalitions and a second level game between the players within a coalition. This two games are the same as already introduced for games with coalition structure, namely the external game (M, v P ), and the µ-internal game (P r , v Pr µ ). We then obtain the following proposition, which introduces a general share function for games with coalition configuration. Proposition 6. Let µ : G → R be an additive, positive and symmetric function on G, and let ρ µ the general share function for TU-game. Then the function
for all i ∈ P r ∈ P i , P i : {P r ∈ P : i ∈ P r }, is a share function and satisfy for all (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N the following properties: i)
. And since we apply i∈P k to all the P k , we apply it also to all P r ∈ P i . In the same way, since we apply k∈M to all the P k in M , we apply it also to all P r ∈ P i . Then
Moreover we have i)
ii) Since P = {P 1 } with P 1 = N and M = {1} then P i = P r . We have then Π The first property is a generalization of the classical consistency property that we will discuss in the following section. The properties 2 and 3 show that Π µ i (N, v, P ) is a generalization of ψ µ i (N, v, P ) when i belongs to more than one coaliton. Indeed, when i belongs to only one coalition, that is when
, that is for any game (N, v) ∈ G, when there is only one coalition in the coalition configuration or when there is n singleton coalitions in the coalition configuration, we have ρ
The following proposition show that Π µ is Owen-Shapley-CCF share, Π Sh , when µ = µ Sh ; whereas Π µ is Owen-Banzhaf-CCF share, Π B , when µ = µ B .
Proposition 7. The general CCF-share function for games with coalition configuration,
Proof. i) We already provided in Section 3, that ρ
ii) In the same way, we prove that
We can obtain also a CCF-share function for Deegan-Packel, as we obtained ψ
Example 5. We consider once again the game (N, v) as introduced in Example 3, but now we assume that players are organized into a priori coalition configuration, such that P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } with P 1 = {1, 2, 3} , P 2 = {1, 4} and P 3 = {3, 5}. Then the external game M, v P with player set M = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } is given by
Using the two variables µ w (M, v P ) and w |M | |L| , whose values are given in Table 5 , then we have . We search now the shares of each player in the internal game corresponding to Table  7 . And given these values and the weighted vectorsw
, we obtain in Table 8 Table 6 , we obtain ρ . Similarly, for the internal game corresponding to . Note that the share of player 3, which belongs to more than one coalition, is equal to the sum of the share he receives in coalition P 1 and the share he receives in coalition Table 7 v In this section we present five axioms which characterize the general CCF-share function Π µ . In the following axioms, let µ be a symmetric, positive and additive function on G and Π µ a CCF-share function on GP N . The first axiom is the axiom of "generalized consistency". This axiom generalizes to games with coalition configuration, the axiom introduced by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 to characterise the general share function for games with coalition structure. A share function is consistent if the total payoff given by the share to the players in a coalition P k is equal to the share of this coalition in the external game.
Generalized consistency : If (N, v, P ) ∈ GP and P k ∈ P , then:
The second one, is the "null player property". The null player property only requires that a null player in a non-null game earns a zero payoff. In other word, the share of such a player is zero.
Null player property:
The third one is the axiom of "individual symmetry * ". Compared to the classical axiom of individual symmetry, often used to characterize values for games with coalition structure, we must add a condition when we reason in term of CCF-shares function. The classical individual symmetry axiom states that players who belong to the same a priori coalition and are symmetric in the game earn the same share in the payoff. But as a player can belong to more than one a priori coalition in games with coalition configuration, we add the condition that the set of coalitions which i belong is equal to the set of coalitions which j belong. And this only under this condition that the share they receive is equal. If i and j belong to only one coalition, we find the classical axiom of symmetry.
Individual symmetry * : If i, j ∈ P k ∈ P = {P 1 , ..., P m } ∈ P N , are symmetric in (N, v) ∈ G and if for all P r ∈ P i ⇔ P r ∈ P j , then
The next axiom is a generalization of the axiom of "µ-additivity for coalition structure", again introduced by van den brink and van der Laan (2002, 2005) in order to characterize the general CS-share function. According to this axiom, if we sum up two games with coalition configuration then the shares in the sum game is a convex combination of the shares in the separate games.
µ-additivity for coalition configuration: Let µ : G → R be given; for (N, v, P ) and (N, w, P ) ∈ GP N let the function z be given by z = v + w. For i ∈ P r ∈ P i , it holds that µ P k , z
These first four axioms are axioms used by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 to characterize the general share function for games with coalition structure. Indeed, they proved that ψ µ is the unique share function that satisfies this four axioms. The last axiom is an axiom introduced by Albizurri and al. (2006a, 2006b) to characterise values for games with coalition configuration.
To introduce the last axiom, we need the following notations and definitions. Let i, j ∈ N. Given v ∈ G, we denote v i/j the game on N/j defined by
Let P ∈ P N , such that P i ∩ P j = ∅, (i.e. i does not belongs to coalitions where j is), we denote by P i/j the coalition configuration on N/j defined by,
That is in P i/j and v i/j , the players i and j have been amalgamated into a single player, player i. We can say that player j has abandoned the game and now player i represents both players in the new situations.
We say that i, j ∈ N are doubles in (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N if: i) v(S ∪ j) = v(S ∪ i) for every S ⊂ N ; ii) S ∪ {i} ∈ P i → S ∪ {j} , S ∪ {i, j} / ∈ P j , for every S ⊂ N/ {i, j}. Double players can be understood as if they are representing a unique player, i.e. when one of these players joins a coalition, he produces the same effect as if both of them do it.
We are ready to introduce the last axiom.
Merger: If i, j ∈ N are doubles in (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N , and P i ∩ P j = ∅, then for every z ∈ N/ {i, j} , it holds that
Imagine that j leaves the game, and that i represents him. So i will play in the game as if acting as proxy for j in some coalitions, then i and j are double. So according to the axiom of merger that should not have any influence on the payments of the other players. In other word if i and j are doubles, then when they merge, this axiom requires the share not to change for players different from i and j.
Then we obtain the following theorem: Theorem 1. Let µ : G → R be additive, positive and symmetric on G. Then Π µ is the unique CCF-share function on GP N that satisfies generalized consistency, null player, individual symmetry, µ-additivity for coalition configuration and merger.
Let us prove first that Π µ verify all these axioms.
Proof. I) Consistency: This property is already proved in Proposition 6. II) Null player: Let i ∈ P r ∈ P i be a null player in (N, v) 
We must then distinguish two cases: a) If i and j belong only to one coalition, namely P r , P
If i and j belongs to more than one coalition, by definition T ∈ P i ⇔ T ∈ P j , then
And Π µ satisfy the individual symmetry * . IV) µ-additivity: We must distinguish three cases: 1) We suppose first that (N, z) is a null game. Since z = v 0 , P r , z P are null game. Therefore the µ-additivity is true. 2) Assume now that (N, z) ∈ G + and i ∈ P r ∈ P is a null player in (N, z). Then he is also a null player in (N, v) and (N, w) because these games are both monotonic game. With the same arguments as above for the null player axiom, we show that Π µ (N, z, P ) = 0 and that i is a null player in
In the same way we show that µ P r , w
Pr µ = 0. Therefore the µ-additivity is verified.
3) To finish, consider the case that i is not a null player. In that case µ P r , z
. And since the µ-additivity of ρ µ (van den Brink and van der Laan 1998), we have: [µ(Pr,z
).And from the consistency properties,
).
Then the µ-additivity for coalition configuration is satisfied. V) Merger : Let v ∈ G and P ∈ P N and let i and j ∈ N doubles in (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N . We are going to prove that for all z ∈ N \ {i, j}, Π
. In order to do that, we proceed in three steps:
i) The first one aims at proving that v P = v P i/j and therefore that ρ
That is in P i/j players i and j are amalgamated into a same player. But this do not influence the number of coalitions, therefore
And since the fact that j is replaced by i does not affect payments because there 
from the definition of v i/j (S). Then for (α), we have v 
, and for all z ∈ N \ {i, j} , Π
. Then the axiom of merger is verified.
Let us now prove that Π µ is uniquely determined by all these axioms.
Proof. To show uniqueness, suppose that Π µ satisfies the 5 axioms. We will prove that Π µ a is fully determined for every a ∈ N and (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N by induction on
In order to do that we reason in few stages. First step of the induction.
. Then P is a partition, and since Π µ satisfies consistency, null player property, individual symmetry * , and µ-additivity for coalition configuration, then Π µ coincide with the coalitional share ψ µ (since ψ µ is the unique share function that satisfies this four axioms), that is Π µ a (N, v, P ) =ψ µ a (N, v, P ) and therefore Π µ a (N, v, P ) is fully determined. Second step of the induction. Let r ≥ 0, i.e. r ∈ N ∪ 0 and assume that Π µ a (N, v, P ) is determined for every (N, v, P ) ∈ GP N such that
Third step of the induction. We will prove that Π µ a is determined if a ∈ N when
fix a ∈ N. We distinguish two cases: a) There exist j = a, such that j ∈ P q ∩ P l for some P q , P l and P q = P l . Then take i / ∈ N and w ∈ G N ∪i be defined for every
, and consider also the coalition configuration on N ∪ i defined byP = (P/ {P q }) ∪ {P q / {j} ∪ {i}}, we can show:
Firstly, that i and j are doubles in (N ∪i, w,P ) and that Π µ a (N, w,P ) = Π µ a N, w i/j ,P i/j , .
, and i and j are double in w. Merger says that for all i and j doubles, and for all a ∈ N/ {i, j} , we have Π Secondly, we can prove that
. Since i and
, where in all the coalitions containing j, j is replaced by i. And letP = (P/ {P q })∪{P q / {j} ∪ {i}} , where in P q , j is replaced by i. ThenP is a particular case of P i/j , thenP ⊆ P i/j b) Now assume that there is not any j = a, such that j ∈ P q ∩ P l and P q = P l . Since Pq,P l ∈P Pq =P l |P q ∩ P l | ≥ 0, then it holds that a ∈ P q ∩ P l for some P q , P l ∈ P and P q = P l .
Hence for all j ∈ N \a, we are in case a), then Π µ j (N, v, P ) determined for all j = a. And since Π µ is efficient, then Π µ a (N, v, P ) is also determined.
Appendix
We will present in this appendix how van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 obtained a general share function for games with coalition structure, using a µ-internal game different from ours. In our paper we define the external game, as van den Brink and van der Laan (2002, 2005) defined it. This is the external game between coalitions denoted (M, v P ) ∈ G and defined by v P (L) = v(P (L)) = v(∪ j∈L P j ), for all L ⊆ M . But contrary to us, they defined the µ-internal game in another way. Indeed for µ : G → R be an additive, positive and symmetric function on G, game (N, v) ∈ G and a coalition structure P 0 ∈ P N 0 , then their µ-internal game, denoted (P k , v The question is why we change the µ-internal game. There are two main reasons. The first reason, is that with their definition of the µ-internal game, we can't obtain Owen-Banzhaf-CS share from the general share function for games with coalition structure. In their paper they assumed that the CS-share function for games with coalition structure ψ µ is Owen-Shapley-CS share ψ But if they proved it completely for Shapley, they simply assumed that the proof is analogous to those of Owen-Shapley. However this is not the case because if we reason to Owen-Banzhaf-CS share as we reason for Owen-Shapley-CS share, there is a mistake.
Let us first present, the proof they did for Owen-Shapley, and then we will show where is the problem, when we apply it to Owen-Banzhaf. (N, v, P 0 ) = ρ
, it is sufficient to prove that (P k , v P k ) = (P k , v µ Sh (S) = v P k (S), and (P k , v P k ) = (P k , v P k µ Sh ). We will now make the same exercise for Owen-Banzhaf. We need to prove that ψ
, and for this it is sufficient to prove that (P k ,v P k ) = (P k , v 
, from the definition of Banzhaf share (i.e. ρ v(N ) ), we have v
And the problem appears here, because if one follows the same reasoning as Shapley, ϕ B k (M, v P P k |S ) must be equal tov P k (S), which is not always the case. In fact, this is not ϕ B k (M, v P P k |S ) which is equal tov P k (S),
Then we can't conclude that (P k ,v
The second reason is, as the µ-internal game generalize the internal games v P k (S) and v P k (S), our objective was to define it, in the same way this two games are defined. And as noticed by van den Brink and van der Laan (2002 Laan ( , 2005 , the characteristic function for this two games coincide with the Shapley (Banzhaf) value of a coalition P k in the "almost quotient game". That is why the characteristic function of our µ-internal game, is given by v k (M, v P P k |S ) can be also seen as the value of a coalition P k in the "almost quotient game".
Once again, our result are not fundamentally different from us, just a slightly change in the definition of the µ-internal game as we have done and we find all the results they have achieved.
